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Abstract
We consider the causes and solutions for the performance difficulties observed when teams of workers are required to perform 
tasks while adhering to atypical start times and/or deadlines. Several studies in the management research literature (Labianca, 
Moon, & Watt, 2005; Sterling, Lopez-Kidwell, Labianca, & Moon, 2013) have shown this effect. In the Labianca et al. work, the 
difficulties are attributed to increased cognitive load, due to the way that people are taught to tell time using analog clocks. 
However, in general, analog methods of presenting data improve performance rather than degrade it. A different explanation for
the observed drop in performance comes from temporal dissonance (Conway & Limayem, 2010). We develop a theory to explain 
the phenomenon and suggest research to verify this theory, which can be used to develop more refined conclusions about how to 
ameliorate the problem when necessary.
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Introduction
The ringing telephone, the email ping, the walk-in client, the emergency meeting: individual workers, like their 
employers, are frequently called on to be able to switch tasks at a moment's notice (Addas & Pinsonneault, 2010). 
However, two recent papers (Labianca et al., 2005; Sterling et al., 2013) suggest that individuals and groups which 
start their task at an atypical time have more difficulty with performance. Both papers examined the effects on 
performance when respondents were asked to start a task at either a typical time (on the quarter hour – e.g. 3:15) or 
an atypical time (e.g. 3:37). They postulate that the performance drop is due, at its core, to increased cognitive load 
for teams that start at non-prototypical times. Since most people learned to tell time in quarter hour increments on an 
analog clock face, non-prototypical start times require additional calculations to convert the analog clock face to 
numbers, calculate the increments to deadline, and then reconvert that information to an analog face. One of the 
implications of their work is the suggestion that as analog clocks disappear these issues should also disappear. 
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However, questions remain. As they themselves note, there may be interactions with some individual temporal 
characteristics. A great deal of past work, both theoretical and empirical, has indicated that each individual's 
interaction with time is extraordinarily complex, and that reliance on simple clock time misses a great deal of 
important detail. We have previously developed a framework for addressing this complexity in some detail, which 
we have called temporal dissonance. In the present work, we suggest that the performance difficulties observed by 
Labianca and Sterling were more likely due to temporal dissonance in the respondents: the requirement to perform 
work at atypical times interacted with other temporal characteristics to create situations where respondents held 
contradictory views of time. Additional cognitive load, in this scenario, would result either a) from coping 
mechanisms adopted to reduce the dissonance and help performance (such as those groups which corrected their 
task sequencing in the aforementioned studies), or b) directly from the psychological discomfort, and hence reduced 
cognitive capacity, of switching between differing views of time. 
While the exact mechanism of the performance issues is not at the core of their research, it does have significant 
consequences for business. If the performance drop is due to cognitive load of calculating time intervals using an 
analog clock, with the associated errors, the obvious solution is to substitute digital clocks throughout the 
workplace. If, however, the additional cognitive load is due to temporal dissonance or some other factor, digital 
clocks will not eliminate the problem. Most research has shown that information is more quickly grasped via analog 
displays, and thus we suspect that digital clocks may in fact may exacerbate the problem by further increasing 
cognitive load. Our research question, then, is: are analog clocks responsible for the drop in performance seen when 
people must start tasks at non-prototypical times?
1. Literature Review
We begin this discussion by noting that a clock face is, at base, an informational display. Much research has been 
done in order to determine the best way(s) to present information quickly and accurately, such as airplane cockpits, 
etc. Because analog faces are preferred in most environments where quick response is required, we disagree that the 
cognitive load observed by Labianca and Sterling is caused by analog clocks. In a study comparing analog and 
digital speedometers, it was found that, although a simple task to determine speed did favor a digital speedometer, 
when performing more complex tasks drivers responded more quickly to changes in analog speedometers 
(Rothengatter & Huguenin, 2004). Related specifically to clock reading, a study of children learning to tell time 
showed that relative times were easier with analog clocks, and that for older children there were no differences in 
their processing of analog and digital times (Friedman & Laycock, 1989). When children compared differences in 
times, analog displays were superior. Perhaps most tellingly, respondents reported imagining analog clock faces in 
the digital conditions (Paivio, 1978). A different study has shown an improved ability to tell differences between 
times with digital faces (Goolkasian & Bunting, 1985); however, a more recent study indicated that while subjects 
were able to read times from digital displays more quickly, when this was combined with other tasks such as 
determining offsets there was no advantage for digital displays (Miller & Penningroth, 1997). Altogether, these 
findings suggest that there is no strong advantage to using digital clock faces in reducing cognitive load, and that 
digital clock faces may increase cognitive load when comparing or predicting times.
Much research in human activity has been performed using simple linear clock time. However, time is an 
extraordinarily complex entity, even as a mere question of physical reality (Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, & 
Tushman, 2001). The “physical reality” is then processed through psychological filters which are informed by social 
and cultural differences, to construct internal models of time (“temporal structures”) which guide our understanding 
and use of time (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). These temporal structures comprise many individual characteristics 
which have been studied, such as time urgency, temporal focus, hurry, chronicity, chronotype, temporal discounting, 
event time, periodic time, and entrainment, to name only a few. Groups of these characteristics have been put
together in constructs such as “temporal perspective” or “temporal personality,” (Saunders, 2007), but these 
constructs tend to lose detail when attempting to describe an individual's interaction(s) with time.
However difficult it may be to accurately describe time and our interactions with it, it is a crucial factor in the 
workplace, and many researchers have attempted to explore the work-time intersection. One recent work suggests 
that people can “categorize” time as either like or unlike the present, and change their task initiation based upon that 
(Yanping Tu & Soman, 2014), and that considerations of time are more affective than cognitive, which can change 
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their consumption preferences (Lee, Lee, Bertini, Zauberman, & Ariely, 2015). A prominent stream of literature in 
the IS field examines the negative impact of interruptions on performance (Addas & Pinsonneault, 2010; Basoglu, 
Fuller, & Sweeney, 2009). These interruptions effectively cause task switches and happen at arbitrary times, causing 
task starts at atypical times, thus the importance of an appropriate response.
One of the most crucial explorations of time in the workplace is the “punctuated equilibrium” group development 
model (Gersick, 1988, 1989). In this framework, accurate assessment of start/end times is essential if teams are to 
complete tasks properly, since they will change their work tasks according to their calculation of time remaining for 
the task. Gersick observes that groups of people create an internal time frame which may not refer to external time 
in any way, based on a combination of the temporal characteristics of the team members and the time frames of their 
tasks. Thus, the internal representation of time incorporates, but is much richer than, the time shown on the clock. 
Both Labianca and Sterling acknowledged this implicitly, as they controlled for “individual hurry” (Labianca et al., 
2005; Sterling et al., 2013) using a component of the time urgency scale (Conte, Landy, & Mathieu, 1995). 
However, given the richness of our internal construction of time, there are other characteristics that may affect the 
perceptions of time, such as temporal focus (Shipp, Edwards, & Lambert, 2009), chronicity (Bluedorn, 2002), 
construal theory (Trope & Liberman, 2000) and the full panoply of time urgency such as deadline importance and 
time awareness (Conte et al., 1995).
The current work on temporal dissonance presents a potentially more useful view of how these differences may 
play out. When people or teams get confronted with temporal structures that differ from their own, they try to 
incorporate them, resulting in contradictory temporal structures: their preferred perspective, that of others in the 
group (in team situations), and those imposed by the environment in which they find themselves. In an experimental 
situation, those potential differences become salient, leading to an affective reaction of discomfort, known as 
temporal dissonance (Conway & Limayem, 2008, 2010, 2011).
Temporal dissonance was developed through analogy to cognitive dissonance, a well-established theory which 
says that when people hold contradictory beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions, they suffer psychological discomfort, 
and in order to reduce this discomfort, they will engage in coping mechanisms which attempt to resolve the 
contradictions. These coping mechanisms take cognitive resources to implement and thus increase the individual's 
cognitive load. Individuals who do not act to reduce the discomfort remain in a negative affective state, which 
reduces their cognitive capacity. Temporal dissonance, being analogous to cognitive dissonance, invokes these same 
mechanisms, and thus also leads to higher cognitive load. We postulate that individuals faced with atypical times 
will resolve them to prototypical times, based on their other temporal characteristics. When working in teams, there 
will be disagreement about time remaining on task and over- or under-correction, due to the shift in their temporal 
framework. Atypical times are likely to exacerbate any tendency to temporal dissonance or other discord in the team 
or individual. A very simple example is trying to agree on what time to leave in order to arrive at a party.
2. Theory Development
In their papers, Labianca and Sterling propose that the performance differences seen between groups and 
individuals starting at prototypical times versus atypical times are due to the cognitive effort of calculating deadlines 
and transition points for their tasks. We are trained to tell time starting with the hour, then adding half hours, then 
quarter hours, and finally individual minutes. Thus the cognitive load of determining prototypical durations (15, 30, 
45, and 60 minutes) from prototypical times is lower than that required for arbitrary times or arbitrary durations. 
(The aforementioned articles do not discuss atypical durations; but that is an obvious extension of their argument).
This view suggests that all atypical times are equal. Any time which deviates from the quarter-hour entails the 
cognitive load of shifting to the individual minutes on the clock. This directly implies that a starting time of one 
minute past the hour is just as bad as starting 7 minutes after the hour, but this seems counter-intuitive. Most of us, 
when confronted with a time which is one minute past the hour, read the time as on the hour. If the respondents in 
the aforementioned papers had done so, they would be expecting the end of the task on the hour, with transition 
points at prototypical times, and would perform comparably with those that started exactly on the hour. Similarly, a 
time 14 minutes past the hour is would be considered to be on the prototypical quarter-past mark.
We frequently see this mindset; for example, meetings tend to be set at prototypical times, and most people 
consider themselves as “on time” if they arrive between a couple of minutes before to a couple of minutes after the 
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prototypical time. There are exceptions to the habitual preference for prototypical scheduling, (e.g. doctor visits), but 
when we get these types of appointments, they bother us, and we tend to latch on to the previous prototypical time 
as an anchor point. This anchoring to prototypical times leads directly to the temporal dissonance explanation for the 
observed phenomenon.
Labianca's argument in favor of cognitive load depends upon the premise that reading a clock face, and 
interpreting a prototypical duration from an arbitrary time requires significant cognitive resources. Research has 
shown that our brains have highly optimized components for dealing with visual stimuli in ways that do not use 
cognitive resources. When we see our grandmother, we do not cognitively flip through some mental picture album 
labeled “people I have seen before” in order to consciously match the face of our grandmother. Instead, the brain 
offloads that function, with the visual cortex shunting directly to memory to come up with the connection. Cognitive 
load does not rise unless visual perceptions happen out of context – e.g., when you meet your doctor at the grocery 
store, it may take a bit before you recognize her, even though you see her regularly at her office. Thus, a prototypical 
end time will be handled automatically, but atypical end times incur cognitive load.
Labianca et al. argue that analog clocks increase that cognitive load. However, we have already seen research 
showing that many people visualize clock faces when calculating durations from digital clocks. We have also see 
that analog clocks may be more quickly integrated than digital clocks, which require the cognitive effort of relating 
the abstract digits (obviously quickly recognized) with the abstract concept of time. Based upon these results, we 
propose the following expansion to Labianca's explanation, based on previous work in temporal dissonance.
Labianca et al. clearly show that people prefer time in 15 minute increments. When confronted with a start time 
of 10:07. they dislike the time, which conflicts with their preference for prototypical times. In order to reduce their 
cognitive load, they may choose to resolve this conflict internally by anchoring to the nearest prototypical time. A 
past-focused person will anchor to 10:00, while a future focused individual will anchor to 10:15. Although this does 
reduce their cognitive load, the past-focused person has effectively given themselves only 53 minutes to do the task, 
while the future-focused individual will be surprised by an “early” ending time, perhaps before they finish the task. 
In both cases, they are likely to switch tasks, as per Gersick, at an inappropriate moment.
Temporal dissonance further posits that this experiment, by confronting respondents with an atypical time, makes 
them uncomfortable, and the time limitation placed on them makes their discomfort salient. They then choose a 
coping strategy: either discounting the difference, which is likely to cause performance problems, or incurring the 
cognitive load of keeping the atypical start/end times at the forefront of their mind. In either case, the coping 
strategy itself uses cognitive resources, increases cognitive load, and possibly also affects their performance. Other 
temporal characteristics might change the exact coping strategy, but in all cases, the person's temporal personality 
leads to temporal dissonance, which is reduced in some fashion or simply suffered. The former leads to higher 
cognitive load; the latter, reduced cognitive resources. Either way, the effective resources usable for the task are 
reduced, thus resulting in reduced performance.
Having explored at some length the literature relating to digital and analog clock faces, and temporal dissonance 
in the work place, we can now begin to examine the nature of the solution space and the possible solutions presented 
by predictions of the two alternate explanations, which will enable us to design an effective experiment. In general, 
workers confronted with a task at an atypical time must confront additional tasks which can be grouped as follows: 
correctly reading atypical start times; correctly calculating atypical durations; and a combination of those two 
conditions. We now compare the two explanations we have discussed.
If the observed cognitive load is directly due to difficulty in correctly reading atypical start times on an analog 
clock face, all atypical times should be equally different and performance should be equally reduced at any atypical 
time. If it is due to temporal dissonance resulting from the requirement to track fractions of a quarter hour, we 
expect that dissonance, and hence cognitive load, will increase as the distance from prototypical times increase.
Another way to examine the question of clock reliability comes when we consider atypical durations from 
prototypical times. Again, if this is direct cognitive load from the difficulty of reading an analog clock face, the 
difficulty should be constant for any atypical time; 14 minutes should be just as difficult as 22 minutes. On the other 
hand, the temporal dissonance explanation suggests that the effect would vary, getting worse the further the atypical 
time was from a 15 minute increment. 
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3. Proposed Research
Having made the case for examining the source of the performance drop seen by Labianca, we now outline a 
research program. We begin by noting that Labianca defined a prototypical time as on the hour (e.g. 3:00) and an 
atypical time as seven minutes after the hour (3:07). While this approach makes the effect easier to spot, it does not 
lend itself well to an exploration of possible solutions. For example, is a start time of one or two minutes after the 
hour equally problematic? If it is not, is this fundamentally a rounding problem? In elementary mathematics, we are 
taught a rule of thumb for rounding numbers; should we also be teaching a heuristic for rounding times? Other 
questions and solutions can also be explored. Perhaps the first task is to verify that there is an issue with cognitive 
load. Previous studies could be repeated, with the addition of a measure of cognitive load to determine whether 
cognitive load increases with atypical times. We were unable to find any evidence that this has, as yet, been done.
In the meantime, we propose a more direct study, in which the task of time estimation with typical and atypical 
times, using digital and analog clock faces, is separated from other tasks, and the cognitive load of that task is 
directly measured. Three obvious results suggest themselves. If the additional cognitive load is entirely due to 
reading analog clock faces, we would expect our subjects facing analog clocks to perform noticeably worse given 
atypical times, regardless of how atypical. If the cognitive load is due to rounding errors, we would expect 
performance to vary with distance from prototypical times. If, however, temporal dissonance or another factor in 
individual and group interaction with time is at the root of the performance issues, we would expect to see no 
substantial difference between typical and atypical times, or between analog and digital clock faces, since our task 
does not tend to increase the subjects' temporal dissonance. We anticipate that, in addition to clarifying the sources 
of cognitive load, this experiment will show that analog clocks are better, or at least no worse, than digital clocks.
Conclusions
While it may seem a small issue, we hope that this research can guide businesses and individuals who seek to 
improve their performance in an increasingly interrupted workplace. If, as Labianca and Sterling suggest, 
performance suffers when individuals are required to calculate times from an analog clock face, the solution is fairly 
simple. If, however, these performance issues are arising from cognitive load due to some other source, such as 
temporal dissonance, changing clock faces will not help performance, and may in fact aggravate the problems. Since 
changing clock faces seems so obvious, and so simple, we are concerned that pro-active businesses may be in some 
danger of implementing a solution which increases their problems.
References
Addas, S., & Pinsonneault, A. (2010). IT Interruptions in Project Environments: A Taxonomy and Preliminary Performance Investigation. In 
SIGHCI 2010 Proceedings. St. Louis, MO, USA.
Ancona, D. G., Goodman, P. S., Lawrence, B. S., & Tushman, M. L. (2001). Time: a New Research Lens. Academy of Management Review,
26, 645–563.
Basoglu, K. A., Fuller, M. A., & Sweeney, J. T. (2009). Investigating the Effects of Computer Mediated Interruptions: An Analysis of Task 
Characteristics and Interruption Frequency on Financial Performance. International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, 10, 177–189.
Bluedorn, A. C. (2002). The Human Organization of Time: Temporal Realities and Experience. Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books.
Conte, J. M., Landy, F. J., & Mathieu, J. E. (1995). Time urgency: Conceptual and construct development. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80,
178–185.
Conway, C. M., & Limayem, M. (2008). Time Management and Temporal Dissonance in Global Virtual Teams. In Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2008). Paris, France.
Conway, C. M., & Limayem, M. (2010). Adrift in the Sands of Time: A Theory of Temporal Dissonance in the Individual. In Proceedings of 
the Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2010. Montréal, QC, Canada.
Conway, C. M., & Limayem, M. (2011). “You Want It When?” How Temporal Dissonance in IT Workers Contributes to Project Failures. In 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2011). Shanghai, China.
Friedman, W. J., & Laycock, F. (1989). Children’s Analog and Digital Clock Knowledge. Child Development, 60, 357–371.
Gersick, C. J. G. (1988). Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model of Group Development. Academy of Management 
Journal, 31, 9–41.
Gersick, C. J. G. (1989). Marking Time: Predictable Transitions in Task Groups. Academy of Management Journal, 32, 274–309.
Gevins, A., & Smith, M. E. (2000). Neurophysiological Measures of Working Memory and Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability and 
Cognitive Style. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 829–839.
745 Christopher M. Conway /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  213 ( 2015 )  740 – 745 
Goolkasian, P., & Bunting, M. (1985). Calculation of time differences between pairs of clock times. Acta Psychologica, 58, 219–224.
Labianca, G., Moon, H., & Watt, I. (2005). When Is an Hour Not 60 Minutes? Deadlines, Temporal Schemata, and Individual and Task Group 
Performance. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 677–694.
Lee, L., Lee, M. P., Bertini, M., Zauberman, G., & Ariely, D. (2015). Money, Time, and the Stability of Consumer Preferences. Journal of 
Marketing Research (JMR), 52, 184–199.
Miller, R. J., & Penningroth, S. (1997). The Effects of Response Format and Other Variables on Comparisons of Digital and Dial Displays. 
Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 39, 417–424.
Orlikowski, W., & Yates, J. (2002). It’s About Time: Temporal Structuring in Organizations. Organization Science, 13, 684–700.
Paivio, A. (1978). Comparisons of mental clocks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 4, 61–71.
Rothengatter, T., & Huguenin, R. D. (2004). Traffic & Transport Psychology: Proceedings of the ICTTP 2000. Elsevier.
Saunders, C. (2007). Perspectives on Time. MIS Quarterly, 31(4), iii–xi.
Shipp, A. J., Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S. (2009). Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus: The Subjective Experience of 
the Past, Present, and Future. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 110, 1–22.
Sterling, C., Lopez-Kidwell, V., Labianca, G. (Joe), & Moon, H. (2013). Managing Sequential Task Portfolios in the Face of Temporal 
Atypicality and Task Complexity. Human Performance, 26, 327–351.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2000). Temporal construal and time-dependent changes in preference. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 79, 876–889.
Yanping Tu, & Soman, D. (2014). The Categorization of Time and Its Impact on Task Initiation. Journal of Consumer Research, 41, 810–822. 
